Ethereum Proposer-Builder Separation: PBS Explained
PBS splits block construction from proposal on Ethereum, compressing MEV yield gaps between solo stakers and large pools while shifting power to builders.
№ 002EthereumMEV and Validator Economics in Ethereum's Builder Market
How miner extractable value reshapes validator revenue when block builders control proposal rights, mechanics, numbers, and what most miss.
№ 003EthereumEthereum Inclusion Lists: Constraining Builder Censorship
Inclusion lists let validators force transactions into blocks without dismantling MEV auctions, the mechanism, tradeoffs, and problem they solve.
№ 004EthereumEthereum Inclusion Lists and Censorship Resistance
How Ethereum's inclusion list auction design limits builder censorship power, with concrete mechanics and honest caveats about what it can and can't fix.
№ 005EthereumEthereum Inclusion Lists and Builder Censorship
Inclusion lists let validators force transactions into blocks without ending builder specialization. The mechanism, its limits, and what it changes in practice.
№ 006EthereumEthereum Proposer Boost: Stopping Short-Range Reorg Attacks
Proposer boost adds a 40% committee-weight bonus to timely blocks, raising the cost of short-range reorg attacks above rational MEV profit thresholds.
№ 007EthereumEthereum Proposer-Builder Separation Explained
PBS splits block building from block proposing, reshaping MEV incentives, validator yields, and where ordering power actually concentrates.